The Kansas City Star this week is running a series of editorial suggesting an exit plan that will lead to peace and prosperity in Iraq and the region. For a look at the entire package, go to this link. Let us know if you think our exit plan is on the right track.

By The Kansas City Star Editorial Board

WASHINGTON -- Getting out of Iraq can’t mean a total exit.

Too much is left undone, particularly in one of the top priorities: Iraq’s military.

And that’s going to mean leaving a substantial U.S. force there for years to come. It won’t require anything like the 100,000-plus present now, but most estimate 30,000 military personnel will be needed, including special forces, anti-terror experts, counterinsurgency experts and military trainers. Congress is going to have to remain committed to funding a much smaller but vital force in Iraq, and to helping build Iraqi forces, with the long-term goal of getting out of Iraq permanently.

Iraqi security forces are improving, but they’re not ready. Realistically, they’re going to need backup for years to come. Iraq is almost to the point where its security force can fight. But it’s far from ready to provide logistical support to that force.
And that matters.

Two years ago Iraq was seen as a future haven for al-Qaida. That threat has receded, and few believe al-Qaida will have much luck re-establishing itself as a large force in Iraq because Iraqis do not mix well with strict Sharia Islamic law. But other threats remain and are forming.

The sectarian divide in Iraq is well known: Shiite and Sunni. But perhaps more serious are the developing northern-southern and Arab-Persian splits. And, as a fledgling democracy, even politics will have the potential to turn violent in the coming decade.

This doesn’t mean U.S. troops will be on the front lines. Security forces today on the streets are mostly Iraqi, and have to continue to be Iraqi. But if Iraq isn’t going to break apart, its troops must continue to be trained by American forces and supported from above by U.S. jets.

“The military tradition in Iraq wasn’t a meritocracy. It has to become one to be a truly professional force,” said retired Air Force Col. Steven K. O’Hern, Kansas City author on Iraq and a former head of the Multi-National Force-Iraq counterinsurgency effort.

“The development of an NCO (non-commissioned officers) corps is essential to that, and right now it doesn’t exist.”

Shortly after the U.S. invaded Iraq in March 2003, President George W. Bush’s Iraq administrator, L. Paul Bremer, disbanded the Iraqi military. It was one of the most controversial acts in a long line of controversial acts surrounding the invasion. But what matters now is how that action affects Iraq now.

It means Iraqi security forces have been built from scratch during the last six years. And six years is not enough time to build a major Army and national police force.
U.S. Brig. Gen. David Perkins, sitting at a small table with the slim contingent of U.S. journalists still working in Iraq, used “crawl, walk, run” to define building a professional Army.

He warned against overestimating how quickly the stages pass.

“Everything the U.S. is doing, from now until we cease combat operations, is geared toward getting Iraqi security up to speed to handle issues by themselves,” he said. “The most volatile issue we’ve had is ethno-sectarian violence. We’ve made a huge effort to make forces that are not sectarian. The military has to be loyal to the nation, not any person or sect or region. They have made great progress in that. They are not where we want them to be.”

The last part of that statement is telling, because he’s acknowledging Iraq security forces still suffer from sectarianism, to some degree.

Given that, they aren’t ready and won’t be by 2011 or 2012. Politicians and imams often exert control over certain forces. But, over time, this issue can be solved. As Perkins put it, it shouldn’t be too long before the U.S. is merely “training the trainers.”

In the meantime, long-term success means stepping back as often as possible and allowing Iraqi forces complete control of security situations, with more experienced U.S. troops held back in reserve roles. The U.S. key phrase is a “fully professional military,” meaning one devoted to Iraq.

That’s complicated by the fragmented nature of their forces: army, national police, Peshmurga (Kurdish) in the north, and the Sons of Iraq.

The Sons of Iraq were, mostly, Sunni insurgents, often in league with al-Qaida, who then turned on the terrorist organization and became essential to the success of the surge.

Michael O’Hanlon, Iraq and U.S. security policy expert for the Brookings Institution think tank, said the growing lack of trust between them and Shiite leaders is dangerous. Enough so that it’s a good reason for a U.S. presence.

“Arab nations want us in Iraq to prevent it from tearing itself to pieces, which would destabilize the region,” he said.

Continuing to expose American troops — including some embedded within Iraqi ranks — to a declining risk in Iraq in the coming years is a far better solution than pulling everyone out and watching the place collapse.